What makes political life in the United States so different from political life in France, Hungary or Argentina? This paper considers why societies "do politics" differently. We draw on Pierre Bourdieu's criticism of substantialist thinking in sociology and on his conceptualization of the social space to propose a new way of relating methodological to theoretical claims in comparative political sociology. We do this by exploring and constructing a "space of polities" based on data from the 2004 World Values Survey, using relational statistical techniques (e.g., geometric data analysis). The main insight is that any single form of political action (e.g., joining a voluntary association, or a demonstration, or a boycott) only takes its meaning in the context of its objective relationship to other forms of political action and non-action that have currency in each particular society. We explore the diversity of polity types that actually exist and discuss how they emerge from similar configurations in countries' spaces of political practices. We suggest that the reason for such clustering lies in similar political-historical trajectories. We conclude by arguing for a comparative approach that is sensitive to differences in overall systems of relationships.
Introduction
There are three main ways of conceiving social "groupness" in sociology: groups can be defined by actual patterns of social interaction between individuals, by patterns of similarity and difference in shared individual characteristics (e.g. [ 1 3 8 _ T D $ D I F F ] gender, age), or by patterns of similarity and difference in behavior (people who "do" or "don[ 2 2 1 _ T D $ D I F F ] 't do" certain kinds of things, e.g. churchgoers or non-voters). In the first instance, the driving metaphor is that of a social network of interconnectedness; the second model proposes an a priori, theoretical reading of groupness; the third constructs groupness on the basis of shared [ 1 3 9 _ T D $ D I F F ] observable behavior (see Bourdieu, 1984; [ 1 4 0 _ T D $ D I F F ] De Nooy, 2003; Vaisey & Lizardo, 2010; Goldberg, 2011 Goldberg, : 1399 . For instance, we can imagine membership in groups of musical listeners as an actual group of people who discuss or listen to music or go to concerts together, as a pre-existing, theoretical group whose characteristics we think are relevant for the differentiation of musical styles and marketing (e.g. African Americans); or as an analytical group constructed on the basis of a whole range of politics because they fear being perceived as 'activists' as opposed to belonging to the more palatable category of "selfinterested citizens."
The broader point is that what heavy metal represents, or what signing a petition means, depends, respectively, on the whole social structure of the space of musical tastes, and the whole structure of the space of political practices, which of course also varies across countries depending on specific institutional configurations and embodied collective representations (Eliasoph & Lichterman, 2003) . We can better comprehend what petitioning [ 1 5 0 _ T D $ D I F F ] or striking means by placing each practice not only in relation to the particular institutional context and political opportunity structure in which it is embedded, but also in relation to the whole space of political likes and dislikes, actions and non-actions, possibilities and impossibilities, which are readily observable in that context. In this respect we follow not only Bourdieu but many other sociologists who, especially in the study of cultural tastes (Breiger, 2000; Lena & Petersen, 2008; Petersen & Kern, 1996; Vaisey & Lizardo, 2010; Goldberg, 2011) or systems of belief and meaning ([ 1 5 1 _ T D $ D I F F ] Mohr, 1998; Martin, 2000; Mohr & Bogdanov, 2013; Ghaziani & Mohr, 2014) use quantitative tools to map shared patterns of practice or understanding (also see Silber, 1995 on the use of spatial metaphors in sociology).
From Politics on Paper to the Space of Political Practices
One of the best illustrations of the difference between the two analytical strategies (substantialist versus relational) can be found in Pierre Bourdieu's critique and re-conceptualization of class analysis (see especially 1984, 1985) . Marxist analysis, Bourdieu argues, provides us with a theoretical vocabulary for talking about classes as defined by certain properties (e.g. the relationship to the means of production) [ 2 2 9 _ T D $ D I F F ] and for analyzing what happens to classes (defined in this way) as they interact with one another. But Marxist "classes" are abstract constructions, "classes on paper" (Bourdieu, 1985, p. 725) whose "groupness" is derived from a theoretical position [ 2 3 0 _ T D $ D I F F ] rather than from the empirical reality of practices. "Social classes do not exist. .[ 2 3 1 _ T D $ D I F F ] . . What exists is a social space, a space of differences, in which classes exist in some sense in a state of virtuality, not as something given but as something to be done" (Bourdieu, 1998, p. 12, emphasis in text) .
From this point of view, two individuals who share a similar position in social space, whether this position is defined onedimensionally (e.g. in terms of ownership of the means of production) or multi-dimensionally (e.g. in terms of relative endowments in economic, cultural and social capital), do not naturally form a group. What creates "groupness" is, first, the fact that the probability to coalesce (that is, to form institutionalized entities) rises with social proximity: the aforementioned socio-demographic qualities will, under particular circumstances, translate into empirical proximity. Additionally, there is the cultural labor of group making, the institutionalization of stable properties to cover an otherwise disparate aggregate of individuals through the objectification of new representations (through performative acts and phrases-e.g. "workers of the world, unite!"), organizations (with chairs, delegates, members, etc.), and symbols (Bourdieu, 1985; Brubaker, 2004 Sewell, 1996; Swartz, 2013; Wedeen, 2002) . Bourdieu, 1985, p. 727) . It is the actors' perceptions of the social world -which are themselves relationally determined through the practical experience of this world, [ 2 3 2 _ T D $ D I F F ] particularly the struggles, conscious and unconscious, over the distribution of symbolic power (i.e. the power to name, categorize, label, and institute) -that contribute to produce and reproduce relatively stable relationships (which may therefore take on an "objective" character). One of the greatest achievements of Distinction comes from making such concrete groupings visible by grounding the notion of class in the unconscious "collective orchestration of practices" rather than in conscious, purposive collective action. Classes,[ 1 5 5 _ T D $ D I F F ] in this perspective, are the empirically realized sharing of certain lifestyles and social properties. Rather than being posited [ 2 3 3 _ T D $ D I F F ] a priori, coherence emerges from the actual practices of agents [ 2 3 4 _ T D $ D I F F ] -that is, from the empirical analysis of social closeness or distance (where distance is measured by using some form of geometric data analysis.)
What does all this have to do with politics? We may proceed by analogy here. From a relational point of view, a sociology that defines its object to be the study of "social movements" or "social capital" or "voluntary associations" is just as problematic as Marxist class analysis-and for the same reasons. Treating different forms of political activity as pre-existing, unproblematic constructs makes the relational moment secondary to [ 2 3 5 _ T D $ D I F F ] (i.e. a consequence of[ 2 3 6 _ T D $ D I F F ] ) the definitional one. Furthermore, such a strategy establishes the a priori comparability of objects across polities that may largely obscure the true empirical differences, which are not to be found in the objects as such, but instead in the relational space within which these objects get constituted. Each form of political activity (e.g. demonstrations, voting, voluntary associations' membership) is merely a point in a space of relations whose shape and structure still needs to be determined.
Spaces of political practices may thus be constructed out of a wide array of indicators.[ 2 3 7 _ T D $ D I F F ] Examples include the types of commitments (in time or money) people make in [ 2 3 8 _ T D $ D I F F ] such practices, the types of actions they carry out (participating in demonstrations, strikes, sit-ins; signing petitions; writing checks; issuing statements); the types of organizations involved (e.g. public or private; large or small); [ 2 3 9 _ T D $ D I F F ] and the social characteristics of their members or leaders. Correlatively, it is this space, this totality, which ought to constitute the true object of study-both what needs to be explained and what explains the nature and shape of the constitutive elements.
One great advantage of such an analytical position is that it allows for a rather capacious definition of the political. Thus in his holistic treatment of "democracy in America," [ 1 5 6 _ T D $ D I F F ] de Tocqueville (2000) [ 1 5 7 _ T D $ D I F F ] saw the benefits of integrating into his analysis such different objects as the media, associations, the courts, the voting system, and administrative structures. Likewise, we should try to incorporate as many varied types of data as possible to map out, for selected nations, a space of political practices. (Ancelovici, 2009 ) Such a strategy [ 2 4 0 _ T D $ D I F F ] is analogous to Bourdieu's efforts to map the space of cultural practices out of such disparate data as the food people eat, the music they listen to, the magazines they read, or the sports they practice.
From polities on paper to the space of polities
Even though Bourdieu himself never ventured into full-fledged cross-national comparisons, such comparisons are always implicit in his work. For instance, he rejected as "substantialist" critiques that dismissed his indicators of "distinction" (e.g. going to a museum or listening to opera) as irrelevant in the U.S. context. His relational model, he argued, does not presuppose in any way that it is the same lifestyle practices that will establish social distinction in France and in America (e.g. 1998, 1-3) . He made a similar point in a telling side comment about poor women's voting patterns in France and Japan (1998, 4) :
"In Japan, the rate of participation in general elections is highest among the least educated women of rural districts, whereas in France, as I demonstrated in an analysis of non-response to opinion polls, the rate of non-response -and of indifference to politics -is especially high among women and among the least educated and most economically and socially dispossessed. This is an example of a false difference that conceals a real one: the apathy associated with dispossession of the means of production of political opinions, which is expressed in France as simple absenteeism, translates, in the case of Japan as a sort of apolitical participation."
Ultimately, determining which practices create social differences, and in which way, is always context-[ 2 4 1 _ T D $ D I F F ] dependent. We can only reveal them exposing the "principles of objective differentiation" at work in each particular social space. In fact, the only assumption that is necessary to the theory is the notion that every society is a society of difference. But different societies will always have different principles of social differentiation.[ 2 4 2 _ T D $ D I F F ] In socialist societies, for instance, cultural and political capital may have played a proportionately bigger role than in non-socialist societies [ 2 4 3 _ T D $ D I F F ] because economic capital is "officially out of bounds." (Bourdieu, 1998, p. 16) To sum up, we take as our object the relationship between two structures: the structure given by the relations among the political practices found in each particular country and the structure given by the relative positions of states. (Jepperson, 1993; Bourdieu, 1984 Bourdieu, , 1993 Laurison, 2015 [ 2 4 9 _ T D $ D I F F ] ), correspond to different positions in social space. But different political formations also have different "rules of the game" relative to the production of opinions as a form of political competence (Bourdieu, 1984; Herbst, 1992) [ 2 5 0 _ T D $ D I F F ] or to participation in activist politics. Political competence and political dispositions (or the cognitive, emotive, perceptual and action schemas through which people relate to politics, and which are themselves structured by the social worlds they are a part of-see Bourdieu, 2000:155) thus mediate between the space of positions and that of position-takings (i.e., political opinions and political practices). For example, countries like Sweden, Finland, and Iceland occupy similar positions within a space of polities.[ 2 5 1 _ T D $ D I F F ] This is largely due to their broadly similar institutional properties. Correspondingly, on average, respondents from those countries tend to take political positions that reflect the institutional properties of their country and that are opposed to the position-takings of, for instance, Russian or Hungarian respondents (countries that have much more strongly "statist" traditions).
What this suggests for us is that the objective differences observed in the structure of the national political spaces, and beyond in the space of polities, are homologically related to subjective differences in the actual experience, socialization, [ 2 5 2 _ T D $ D I F F ] and representation -in short, the culture -of politics. Different practices and strategies will appear more or less doable, thinkable, or emotionally meaningful (Almond & Verba, 1963; Emirbayer & Goldberg, 2005) both across different national political spaces [ 2 5 3 _ T D $ D I F F ] and within each national space depending on the institutionalized relational configuration of practices, strategies and movements. Hence we may not simply relate the well-documented differences in the strategies and practices of strikers in France and the United States (Friedman, 1988) to differences in the institutional or resource environment strikers face, but, more fundamentally and phenomenologically, to their culturally different relation to politics and claimsmaking as expressed in the broader structure of each of these countries[ 2 5 4 _ T D $ D I F F ] ' political "space."
3. The space of polities in practice: an empirical illustration
Data and methods
We use data from the World Values Survey (henceforth WVS) to conduct a relational analysis of political practices. After removing additional cases due to missing or unavailable data, our final sample includes the 33 countries listed in Table 1 . 1 The main advantage of the survey is its remarkable breadth, which owes a lot to its principal investigator's ambition of mapping cultural change in societies across the world (See Inglehart, 1990 Inglehart, , 1997 Inglehart & Baker, 2000; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005) . Its main shortcoming is the near-identification of culture with values and feelings, which runs into the delicate problem of comparing subjective representations across cultural contexts. As MacIntyre (1971, A significant advantage of both methods is that [ 2 9 0 _ T D $ D I F F ] the two different structures can be represented spatially. This is often done through the use of bi-plots, which map not only component factor loadings (or MCA "coordinates") but also the relative location of cases within our data on those same dimensions. For example we can visualize the relationship between states and between political practices or membership in organizations. Bourdieu (1984) represents together a social space (e.g. demographic characteristics) and a cultural space (e.g. lifestyle practices). This greatly enhances the interpretability of factor scores and provides richer description for the purposes of inductive analysis. Finally, we contextualize our geometric data analyses with comparative case studies of several different polities. This allows us not only to go deeper into our interpretations but [ 2 9 1 _ T D $ D I F F ] also to check them for consistency with what we know from detailed historical and ethnographic case and comparative studies conducted by others.
Our combined use of the MCA and PCA also departs to varying degrees from previous efforts to map cross-national patterns of political attitudes and behavior,[ 2 9 2 _ T D $ D I F F ] such as Inglehart's factor-[ 2 9 3 _ T D $ D I F F ] analytic approach (Inglehart, 1997 , Inglehart & Baker, 2000 [ 2 9 4 _ T D $ D I F F ] or more recent efforts that combine factor analysis with regression (Bonikowski, 2010) or employ Fuzzy Sets (Bail 2008 ). Inglehart's efforts center on demonstrating that individual attitudes vary with country and level of development, and that patterns of cross-national differences map onto known or suspected cultural differences among nations (e.g., Protestant versus Catholic versus Confucian). Factor analysis flows naturally from Inglehart's vision of a latent construct (e.g., postmaterialism) that [ 2 9 5 _ T D $ D I F F ] underlying individual attitudes and societal differences.
2 Bonikowski (2010) goes beyond this, using regression analysis of relational predictors to explain patterns of cultural similarity. Bonikowski's study shares our interest in relationalism (among countries; not at the level of individual practices) and an emphasis on the historical patterns (e.g., imperial history) that may generate meaningful institutional and cultural configurations. Indeed, one might explain some of our observed societal differences with similar regression methods. Bail (2008) provides another intriguing alternative rooted in fuzzy-[ 2 9 6 _ T D $ D I F F ] set analysis that in some ways falls closer to the spirit of our enterprise, as it is more focused on configurations of meaning (though again there is no attempt to link cross-national variation with intra-national patterns). Set-[ 2 9 7 _ T D $ D I F F ] theoretic tools provide an alternative to traditional linear analyses that are particularly suited to identifying complex configurations, and represent a plausible alternative to our approach (if one has sufficient prior theory and knowledge to guide calibration of set membership).
Rather than aspiring to cluster or predict country cultural differences based on attitudes, this study instead interrogates country differences via [ 1 6 2 _ T D $ D I F F ] a relational analysis of national-level political practices to better understand the meaning of societal differences. Our primary goal is both inductive and theoretical: by locating countries on a "map," we argue, we are better able to produce the analytical constructs that will guide and organize our interpretation of cross-national patterns. It also inquires about attitudes, distinguishing those who "might do" the activity versus those who "would never" do such a thing. Aggregate analyses examine the country proportion of individuals who have "actually done" each activity, versus all others. MCA plots examine the full range of WVS categories.
[ 3 1 0 _ T D $ D I F F ] We include additional individual-level demographic [ 3 1 1 _ T D $ D I F F ] measures as supplementary variables in MCA plots:
Gender. Coded dichotomously (male = 1, female = 0). Education. Coded ordinally, as highest level of education completed. To reduce clutter in the MCA plots, we reduced this to three categories: primary degree or less; some secondary or a secondary degree, and those with at least some tertiary education.
Religiosity. Coded ordinally, from 0 to 3. Zero indicates religion is "Not At All Important", 1 "Not Very Important", 2 "Rather Important" and 3 "Very Important". Our first empirical task is to describe how countries fall vis-à-vis one another in terms of the political practices of their citizens (what we call here the "space of polities"). Table 1 offers a summary of the main cross-national variations in a range of political practices for a group of countries selected from the World Values Survey. Countries exhibit very sharp differences. For instance, the highest frequency for street demonstrations and building occupations occurs in France (39% and [ 1 7 3 _ T D $ D I F F ] 9%, respectively); but these practices remain much more rare in Finland (15% and 0.1%). Similarly, the percentage of citizens who have ever signed a petition varies, for instance, from less than [ 1 7 4 _ T D $ D I F F ] 6% in Turkey to over 87% in Sweden; even a country where the return of democracy occurred some 40 years ago, Spain, still stands barely over 27%.
[ ( F i g . _ 1 ) T D $ F I G ]
The principal component analysis presented in Figs. 1 and 2 helps us elaborate the cross-national differences much further. Fig. 1 represents the space of five basic political practices, overlaid with the space of polities.
3 In this first figure, practices related to association-[ 3 1 3 _ T D $ D I F F ] joining (membership in voluntary associations and work in those associations) are not included. Fig. 2 , by contrast, is based on the same data but the two associational variables are now active-that is, they participate actively in the determination of the space.
The volume and temporal structure of political action as organizing dimensions
The two figures show a basic opposition between the "doers," on the right hand side of the map, and the "[ three countries with the highest proportions of people who have been involved in the categories of activities surveyed in the WVS. The second factor opposes the countries whose citizens focus comparatively more on membership activities (Sweden, US, Canada) to those whose citizens "do politics" mainly through means of episodic types of action. Keeping with the Bourdieuian conceptual language, a simple way to interpret these patterns is to point out that while the first dimension captures the relative volume of political action, the second dimension focuses on the structure of this action in terms of the time involvement required. Contributing most to Factor 2 are the volunteering variable, on the one hand, and the street demonstrations, building occupations and strikes variables, on the other. The United States and France exemplify the polar opposition. In the US, volunteering is common while contentious actions are not. Conversely, in France, participation centers on forms of action that reflect a pattern of intermittent outbursts rather than one of long-term, repeated commitment. 
Interpreting the time structure: polity integration and stateness
Until now we have not said much about the underlying political structures that may lie beneath these political patterns. The neo-institutionalist literature in sociology helps provide some clarification. Jepperson (1993 Jepperson ( : 91,2002 ) describes those countries that are low on Factor 1 in our analysis (i.e. our "less active" polities) as "poorly integrated politically," while Jepperson and Meyer (1991:216) refer to them as "segmental" polities. Even though most of these states are now functioning democracies -and some have even been democratic for several decades -they share a fairly recent authoritarian past. The majority of them, indeed, fall into two clearly identifiable categories: [ 3 2 5 _ T D $ D I F F ] 1) vassal states with a long history of subjugation to a strong external rule (Hungary, Belarus, Ukraine and Poland for the last two centuries); and [ 3 2 6 _ T D $ D I F F ] 2) former imperial powers that were ruled militarily from above in the pursuit of "autarchy and dictatorial modernization" (Derluguian, 2007, 5) (Seleny, 1999, 504-05) . Contemporary scholarship on Hungary characterizes the society as politically "quiescent," rather disengaged, and pragmatically oriented toward elite consensus and bargaining in spite of high levels of political dissatisfaction (Seleny, 1999; Ekiert & Kubik, 1998, 554-556; Hankiss, 1989 ). This diagnosis not only agrees with Hungary's location on Factor 1 in our data (the country is very low on every type of action) but also on Factor 2 (Hungary is positioned away from the more episodic/contentious types of political activities).
Hungary is located very close to Poland on the map of the space of polities. Yet while this proximity captures similarities in the two countries' paths into political modernity, Poland's history was also distinctive in important ways. Poland especially contrasts with Hungary on Factor 2, that is, in terms of its level of contentious politics. This is not surprising since, as Seleny puts it, "by the end of the Second World War Hungarians and Poles had reasons to learn profoundly different lessons about the efficacy of open resistance and revolution." (1999:504) Compared to Hungary, Seleny continues, Poland had a much more successful history of rebellion: it emerged victorious in the Polish-Soviet war of 1920-1921. While the country suffered very heavy losses during World War II, it came out of it "free of the weight of collaboration and concomitant issues of moral complexity that burdened Hungary" (505) [ 3 3 2 _ T D $ D I F F ] and found itself on the winning side when the Allies declared victory in 1945. Finally, after Poland turned to communism, the Soviet Union treated the country relatively leniently in comparison to other Eastern Bloc followers. The Poles interpreted this (whether correctly or not) as an acknowledgement of their reputation for open resistance and rebellion (Seleny, 1999, 505) . From the standpoint of politically conditioning experiences, Poland indeed retained a lively political counterculture and an independent Church, even during the imposition of martial law.
Thus, even when we zoom in on a segment of the social space in question, we also find "self-similar" regularities (Abbott, 2001; Bourdieu, 1984; Lorrain & White, 1971) . As may be expected from the hypothesized effects of collective memory, Poland indeed exhibits the highest level of disruptive protest actions, especially by unions, against the state among the four post-communist nations studied by Seleny (1999) . Polish society is marked by relatively "high levels of political mobilization, contentious party competition around several overlapping, deep ethical-ideological cleavages, relatively low levels of elite consensus, and a moralistic political discourse[ 3 3 3 _ T D $ D I F F ] " (Seleny, 1999: 433) .
[ 3 3 4 _ T D $ D I F F ] Let us now turn to yet another country that is low on Factor 1. Like Hungary, Argentina also has a history of relative depoliticization, but it is a very different one. In Argentina, habits of public engagement avoidance actually go back to before twentieth century authoritarianism and its military control of practically all civilian institutions. As many accounts have suggested, because formal political participation was restricted to citizens, because the proportion of immigrants among the Argentinean population was very high, and finally because the procedure for naturalization was very cumbersome and thus rarely picked up, politics in nineteenth century Argentina took the shape of a game between local political factions that left the vast majority of the population indifferent (Rock, 1985; Sabato, 1992) . This politico-demographic situation, combined with an oligarchic influence that was always acute even by Latin American standards (Collier & Collier, 1991:129-131) , forged a form of citizenship that was somewhat more alienated than elsewhere on the continent.
What these examples suggest is that political habits might reproduce themselves through their inscription, first, in the political structure itself and, second, in the memory of past events embodied in people and institutions [ 3 3 5 _ T D $ D I F F ] and passed on through interpersonal interactions and formal and informal socialization (Tilly, 2008) . Thus,[ 3 3 6 _ T D $ D I F F ] Howard (2002) finds in his "experiential approach to societal continuity and change" that the legacy of communism (which, as we have shown in the Hungarian case, often extends back further to an authoritarian pre-communist past) explains in large part the "collective non-participation" habits of some Eastern European citizenries, as well as their low levels of societal trust in general. Having been forced to join all [ 3 3 7 _ T D $ D I F F ] sorts of organizations during communist times, citizens in post-communist European nations were eager not to join any in democratic times.[ 3 3 8 _ T D $ D I F F ] Instead, they chose to continue, instead, to rely on the informal networks that had played such a critical role in helping them get by earlier.
Experiential aspects also explain political patterns at the other end of the continuum captured by Factor 1. We find two types of countries on the side of the "active polities," and they are quite different, depending mainly on their position on (Fig. 1) . Again, history is key here. If anything, three major successful revolutions between 1789 and 1848, and a succession of efficacious contentious episodes since then have taught the French that "taking to the streets" often works: political power either falls, or it responds under pressure. In this country, various forms of "disruptive" action (e.g. demonstrations, building occupations, even strikes) may thus be understood as a more natural route to political socialization than,[ 3 4 0 _ T D $ D I F F ] for instance, joining a voluntary association. The underlying reason for such a pattern of political participation must be found in the political structure itself. France has been dubbed the ideal-typical "statist" nation (Birnbaum & Badie, 1983; Dyson, 1980; Jepperson, 2002) . The state has traditionally embodied the pursuit of rational progress in the name of society, but it remains fairly cut-off from society in its organization and practice: its mission, rather, is carried forward by a highly elitist bureaucracy that is accountable mostly to itself and often acts as [ 1 8 0 _ T D $ D I F F ] an agent of social division, rather than cooperation (Kriesi, Koopmans, Duyvendak, & Giugni, 1995; Ancelovici, 2008) France represents one extreme on Factor 2. The United States is its mirror image. [ 1 8 2 _ T D $ D I F F ] Factor 2 opposes countries that "boycott" and "petition" (e.g. the US) to countries that "demonstrate", "occupy buildings" and "strike[ 3 4 5 _ T D $ D I F F ] " (Fig. 1) . But when associational variables are included in the model (Fig. 2) , the temporal structure of the opposition becomes even more remarkable. Not only do Americans join a lot of associations, as [ 1 8 3 _ T D $ D I F F ] de Tocqueville noticed long ago; they work more in them (the latter variable helps differentiate the United States from Sweden, for instance, in spite of the countries' proximity on other political dimensions). What this suggests is that the axis for Factor 2 may be read -with some qualifications -as the opposition along the statist-societal dimension identified by Jepperson (e.g., 2002) : countries not only harbor quantitatively different Although Factors 1 (volume) and 2 (time structure) represent, by far, the most important sources of cross-national variation in political practice, there is much to gain from a close-up analysis of Factors 3 and 4. Factor 3 (Fig. 3b ) opposes the countries with high levels of union membership (most of them Scandinavian, plus Austria and the Netherlands) to countries with heavy strike and building-[ 3 5 0 _ T D $ D I F F ] occupation activities (mostly France and Italy). This is not a paradox: the labor movement takes a different shape in different nations (Western, 1997): strikes along this dimension are associated with a specific union tradition, represented by the French-Italian model, which historically derives from anarcho-syndicalism and tends to rely on confrontational episodes and organizations. The fact that demonstrations are also strongly and positively associated with Factor 3 suggests that -in those countries well represented on the upper segment of the vertical axis, such as France, Italy, the United States and Belgium -demonstrations might be mainly associated with labor militancy. On the opposite end of Factor 3, we find countries characterized by more "corporate" forms of social organization, as defined by Jepperson (2002) and Schmitter (1974) . Labor participation here is inscribed, fundamentally and phenomenologically, in a different mode of collective belonging, based on large membership organizations that are generally in charge of arbitraging conflicts. More generally, associational memberships in this context often mean the enactment of a role: [ 1 8 4 _ T D $ D I F F ] they are an expression of corporate group belonging (e.g., workers) much more than a form of individual "choice" or a voluntary commitment. They therefore do not necessarily entail much "active" involvement and are not associated with high levels of volunteer work (Fourcade & Schofer, forthcoming) .
This difference really [ 3 5 1 _ T D $ D I F F ] becomes apparent when we look at Factor 4 (Fig. 3c) . Factor 4 does not account for much of the variance (8.14%) but again, the pattern is interesting and [ 3 5 2 _ T D $ D I F F ] interpretable. The main analytical interest of this fourth dimension is that it helps single out the Scandinavian countries, particularly Denmark and to a lesser extent Sweden, [ 3 5 3 _ T D $ D I F F ] that strongly associate high levels of union membership with strikes (but not building occupations). As many commentators (e.g. EspingAndersen, [ 1 8 5 _ T D $ D I F F ] 1990; Lipset, 1961) have suggested, Denmark indeed stands quite apart from the rest of the Scandinavian world, particularly in terms of the pugnacity of its labor movement.
Comparing political spaces
From an externalist point of view, a country is a point in the "space of polities," a location relative to other societies along the dimensions we have just identified [ 3 5 4 _ T D $ D I F F ] and to which we have attributed definite meanings. The location of a country in multidimensional space characterizes a nation's political practices within the broad patterns of variation observed across societies. From an internalist perspective, however, a country is itself a differentiated space of political practices, a bundle of [ 1 8 6 _ T D $ D I F F ] factor loadings that reflect the constellation of practices (and non-practices) observed therein. At the onset of this paper, we gave ourselves the task of describing the political spaces of individual countries and deriving from such examination insights into the meaning of different political practices in their context of performance. In Figs (Fig. 4) is the most distinctive country of all, in the sense that it is composed of a very homogeneous (politically speaking) population whose members are not very active (at the center of the map). To the extent that people participate in contentious politics, they engage mostly in relatively benign forms of claimsmaking (e.g., petitions). Furthermore, and in contrast with the other three countries, participants in "contentious" political activities in Hungary are very much outliers. Supplementary cluster analyses reveal that the [ 3 5 6 _ T D $ D I F F ] most active of these participators are much younger than in other countries, suggesting important cohort effects. Importantly, and dovetailing on our earlier comparison between Hungary and Poland, the Polish "space of political practices" looks quite similar (Fig. 5) . This is not surprising: countries that look structurally similar in the within-[ 3 5 7 _ T D $ D I F F ] country analyses will load together in the broad cross-national analysis.
In contrast to Hungary, the political spaces of the United States, Sweden and France are much more differentiated. However, the principles of this differentiation vary substantially across countries. For instance, in France [ 3 5 8 _ T D $ D I F F ] (Fig. 8) , high participation and membership in voluntary associations is associated with labor activity and generally with contentious political practices. In the United States (Fig. 7) and Sweden ( . In France, on the other hand, there appears to be a greater disconnection between membership in associations and political participation: the non-members/non-workers in associations are an entirely separate group, whereas in the United States and Sweden they are closely associated with the "might dos."
Obviously these analyses are extremely partial and are only meant to illustrate the analytical usefulness of an approach conceived in relational terms. It is of course possible to refine the empirical toolkit much further and get an even greater purchase on the cases. One such strategy involves including more demographic data into the analysis, in order to assess whether the differences we observe in terms of practices also correspond to sociological differences in terms of the people who carry out these practices. We know these variables (education, income, marital status, gender, age, ethnicity, religiosity,[ 3 6 3 _ T D $ D I F F ] etc.) matter across the board: people who are more educated, for instance, tend to participate more in politics. But they might matter differently across nations, as evidenced, for instance, by the different positioning of highly religious people vis-à-vis politics in the US and in (2008) for such an approach using fuzzy-set analysis, or Bonikowski (2010) for a similar perspective using hierarchical cluster analysis). These strategies, however, might dilute the comparative edge we are seeking here by assuming correspondence among categories of individuals across countries.
Conclusion:[ 1 8 8 _ T D $ D I F F ] relation and structure
Our first purpose in this paper has been to show the usefulness of a structural-relational approach, grounded in geometric data analysis, to generate insights into the understanding of cross-national variations in the practice of politics. The main [ ( F i g . _ 7 ) T D $ F I G ] 
